Professor Hans-Georg Moeller : “What Daoism Can Offer Algeria”

Mohsen Abdelmoumen:  Following Niklas Luhmann, you describe society as a set of autonomous systems (the economy, the legal system, the media) without a pilot. If no human controls these systems, isn’t “profilosophy” just an individual illusion designed to mask our total powerlessness in the face of the social machine?

Prof. Hans-Georg Moeller: You are correct that Luhmann’s social systems theory understands society as a complex interrelation of various systems without a single center of control—similar to the human body. The economy, politics, the media, law, science, religion, etc. influence one another in constant feedback loops. This doesn’t mean, however, that these systems are powerless. Mutual influence means that systems are contingent upon one another. Contingency is the key word here. Everything is contingent upon everything else. Contingency means both interdependence and having to choose between options; it indicates a certain leeway, not complete determination. For instance, governments have a certain leeway to make decisions, but these decisions are conditioned by economic, legal, geopolitical, religious, or media circumstances that have to be taken into account. And the outcomes of these decisions are always unsure because their effects are contingent upon developments (decisions) in the other systems.

I guess you mean “profilicity,” not “profilosophy.” Profilicity means that people build a sense of self, their identity, through the curation of profiles. These profiles are curated in social feedback-mechanisms, now often on social media. It is a kind of self-branding. Profilicity reflects the contingency I just mentioned. While everyone has a certain leeway in curating their profiles, this curation happens in the context of a highly complex society. We are embedded in social-validation-feedback-loops which are not controlled by any single individual.

You claim that “profilosophy” has supplanted sincerity and authenticity. If authenticity is now reduced to a marketing ploy aimed at enhancing a profile, is there still room for genuine human interactions beyond the reach of the media?

You are correct that “authenticity” is now often displayed or pretended to enhance a profile. For instance, if a politician can curate a media image that makes him seem “authentic,” he may get more “likes,” or votes.

The genuineness or fakeness of human interactions is conditioned by the identity technologies we use. In sincerity, interactions are shaped by traditional role-relationships such as father-son or husband-wife. People are taken seriously when they are, for instance, regarded as genuine wives or husbands, and they are rejected as fake if they don’t live up to such role identities. In authenticity, interactions are shaped by the mutual expectation of originality. People have to somehow express their Eigenheit, their supposedly unique inner self, to be regarded as truly genuine. If they fail to do this, they are regarded as fake. In profilicity, we expect people to live up to the profiles they curate and display (e.g. on social media), and then we regard them as genuine. If they don’t, they appear fake or cringy. Each of these identity technologies produces different forms of what you call “genuine human interactions.”  

You often argue for the need to “demoralize” discourse. How does the hyper-moralization of Western international relations (the “good” versus “evil” dichotomy) hinder the resolution of

current conflicts?

The hyper-moralization of Western international relations makes it very difficult to mediate, interact pragmatically, and find compromises—it promotes war, not peace. Hyper-morality completely delegitimizes the opponent—it creates pariahs—and leaves no room for negotiations. It is a very dangerous form of communication and leads to social and psychological extremism or fundamentalism. It Is worrying to see that, in the West, it now takes on the form of a civil-religious, “liberal” radicalism or fundamentalism.

How does classical Chinese philosophy help us better understand Beijing’s long-term geopolitical strategy in light of the immediacy of Western electoral cycles?

There is a certain influence of what I would call Confucian “paternalism” on Chinese politics. Simply put, the legitimacy of the father lies not in him being elected by the family, but in caring for the family and in maintaining and improving its wealth, social status, and happiness. A somewhat similar view on government has been expressed in Confucianism and is still to some extent prevailing in China. This view entails a more long-term perspective on government rather than a focus on short-term popularity.

If the West functions as a system of interconnected individual profiles, how would you describe China’s internal systemic structure from a Luhmannian perspective?

There is a debate among Luhmann scholars if “functional differentiation”—what you call “society as a set of autonomous systems (the economy, the legal system, the media) without a pilot” in the first question—exists in China or if China is a society with little or no functional differentiation due to the controlling power of the government. It seems to me that China, too, is functionally differentiated, but perhaps to a lesser extent than “the West”.

Is Chinese diplomacy—which is often pragmatic and focused on trade (systemic)—immune to this Western moralizing, or is it developing its own version of moral profiling?

Chinese politics uses much less moralizing in international relations than the current West. The former German foreign minister, for instance, promoted a “value-guided foreign policy” (implying moral criticisms of non-Western countries) whereas China emphasizes non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. In domestic politics, however, the Chinese government tries to promote “socialist core values.” Often, Chinese people disregard this moralizing as political propaganda and are generally more interested in the pragmatic aspects of domestic politics, i.e. economic development and social stability.

Is the European Union doomed to become a museum of Western morality while the rest of the world moves toward a purely functional and technical model?

The EU’s hyper-moralism is by no means merely museal. Its “liberalism” functions as a post-Christian civil-religion that has many radical believers within the EU—especially among the elites in government, media, law, and academia. This moralistic civil-religion has turned into a quite fundamentalist belief-system supporting rearmament and a new militarism. It is aggressively used to discredit and suppress political opposition (on the left and on the right) within the EU and to expand the EU eastward.

According to Niklas Luhmann’s theory, systems seek first and foremost to preserve themselves. Does the EU’s crisis of legitimacy stem from the fact that the European bureaucratic system now communicates only within itself, completely ignoring its external environment?

You are correct that according to Luhmann systems seek first and foremost to preserve themselves. As mentioned, I think that the EU’s bureaucratic system is still quite successful in maintaining legitimacy in its member states, especially in Germany, due to its very effective use of liberal civil religion in the face of an obvious socioeconomic decline and increasing internal political opposition. The EU does not ignore economic and geopolitical pressures, but tries to preserve itself by reacting to them with the hyper-moralization and militarization we just discussed.   

How can European citizens develop an authentic identity if the EU constantly forces them to adopt “good citizen” profiles validated by algorithms and ethical charters?

Given the rise of profilicity, new media, and AI, people everywhere, and not only in the EU, have to become more profilic to achieve a valid identity. For instance, when you apply for a job, compete in a political election, or look for a partner on a dating app, what counts is your profilic identity and not your authentic identity.

You have stated that Europe’s moral superiority complex is a dead end. When countries in the Global South refuse to align themselves with Western positions during major conflicts, is this a break from the West’s “moral/immoral” code in favor of a purely functional and pragmatic code?

I hope so.

Is the Global South healing the international order from Western moral hypocrisy through simple systemic pragmatism? 

I hope so.

In your work on Daoism, you emphasize fluid adaptability in the face of grand moral narratives. Algeria’s history is marked by extraordinary resilience in the face of trauma (colonization, the “Black Decade”). Could we analyze the resilience of the Algerian people through a form of “philosophy of the reed” similar to Daoism, rather than through Western political theories of resistance? 

You harshly criticize the Western concept of human rights as a moralizing geopolitical weapon. How does Algeria—which has often rejected Western moralizing about its internal governance—fit into this broader critique of humanist hypocrisy?

I respond to both questions together:

In my book The Moral Fool (pp. 162-165) I argued against the Jewish-American philosopher Michael Walzer who is famous for his “just war theory” and who claims that many wars fought by the US and Israel were morally right. In one of his publications Walzer criticizes the relativistic saying “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” and points to the Algerian FLN and its intentional killings of French civilians in the 1960s as an example of moral unambiguity: for Walzer, the FLN’s actions were purely evil. Against Walzer, I argue that his simplistic moralist distinction between morally “innocent” victims and morally evil terrorists neither duly reflects the colonialist background of the Algerian War nor the concrete historical and military situation or the existential conditions of the people involved at the time. In short, Walzer’s “just war” philosophy is a prime example of what your question describes as the “Western concept of human rights as a moralizing geopolitical weapon.”

My view on these matters is strongly influenced by Daoism (which you nicely depict as a “philosophy of the reed,” i.e. a non-rigid strategy that reacts to force by evasive resilience rather than by counterforce). I do not counter Walzer’s moralism with a different sort of moralism. I reject his moralistic framework altogether because it only supports endless cycles of violence and justifications of massacres and genocides (e.g. the justification of an Israeli genocide in Gaza in response to a Hamas massacre). More often than not, moral discourse does not prevent violence or resolve conflict, but intensifies and extends it. To resolve a conflict, moral divisions need to be suspended rather than decided in favor of one side against the other. I think Algeria, or any other non-Western country for that matter, would be well advised to develop Daoism-inspired resistance strategies, rather than fall prey to, as you say, “Western political theories of resistance.” Such theories, as in the case of Walzer, all too often serve as a rationale for Western domination in one form or another.

Algeria is strategically positioning itself as a bridge between Africa, the Arab world, and China (through the New Silk Roads). If the world shifts from Western hegemony to a multipolar system without a moral center, what cyber or systemic role can a pivotal country like Algeria play? 

If Algeria can position itself as you say and help promoting a shift “from Western hegemony to a multipolar system without a moral center,” I certainly wish it the best of luck. In my view it would be a wise strategy that could serve as a model for other countries of the global south.

In your book *You and Your Profile*, you explain that “profilicity” has replaced sincerity. Generative AI now makes it possible to simulate a perfect online personality. Is this the ultimate achievement of “profilicity,” or its destruction due to an overload of fake profiles?

Maybe a mixture of both. Time will tell.

Interview conducted by Mohsen Abdelmoumen

Professor Hans-Georg Moeller is an internationally renowned philosopher and academic, specializing in classical Chinese philosophy, comparative philosophy, and Daoism. He is currently a Professor of Philosophy at Macao University.

His research focuses primarily on the foundational texts of Chinese thought, notably the Zhuangzi, the Daodejing (attributed to Laozi), and the Xunzi. He is also interested in ethics, political philosophy, phenomenology, and the intersections between Eastern and Western philosophical traditions. He is particularly appreciated for his ability to make Chinese philosophy accessible and to demonstrate how it can illuminate contemporary philosophical debates.

Among his most notable works are: Daoism Explained: From the Dream of the Butterfly to the Fishnet Allegory (2006) ; The Philosophy of the Daodejing (2007) ; The Moral Philosophy of the Zhuangzi (2011) ; You and Mankind: A History of Confucianism (2019) ; On Nothingness (2022)

Published in French in Algeriepatriotique